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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action commenced by plaintiff. 
penelko, Inc., for claimed violation of certain provisions 
in its lease of real property and for tortious interference 
with its theater business. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered 
against appellant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount 
of $65,000. The lower court entered its judgment on the 
verdict in the sum of $65.000 and denied appellant's motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alter-
native. for a remittitur, or a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant. Price Rentals, Inc., seeks reversal of the 
lower court's judgment. 
FACTS 
A. Lea_s_es And~reements __ Pertaining To 9400 South 
Shopping Center. 
On March 25, 1972, defendants Malstrom leased a parcel 
of real property located on 9400 South and 700 East, Sandy, 
Utah. to plaintiff for the construction and operation of a 
theater business (Pages 3, 1713 and 1714). Subsequently. 
on January 17. 1975. defendants Malstrom notified plaintiff 
that they had agreed to lease a large portion of their prop-
erty to defendant-appellant, Price Rentals, Inc., for the 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purpose of constructing a shopping center (Pages 1779, 1780, 
1989 and 1990). The lease agreement was to include the 
property upon which the plaintiff's theater and an adja-
cent laundromat (owned by two of plaintiff's directors and 
officers) were located, and provided that appellant was to 
take the property subject to the lease rights of plaintiff 
and the laundromat owners (Page 1197). Accordingly, on 
March 27, 1975, defendants Malstrom executed a formal Offer 
to Lease in which Price Rentals was given an option to lease 
two contiguous parcels of real property at the above loca-
tion (Pages '338 and 1839). 
On September 28, 1975. appellant exercised its option 
on the first parcel and entered into a Lease Agreement with 
defendants Malstrom for that parcel (Pages 1838 and 1839). 
Appellant then entered into a Lease Agreement with Grand 
Central, and a Grand Central store was constructed on the 
leased parcel immediately to the northeast of plaintiff's 
theater (Page 1197). In addition, approximately 1,200 park-
ing stalls were constructed immediately south of Grand Cen-
tral and immediately to the east of plaintiff's leasehold. 
(Note: This lease, as well as the other exhibits introduced 
at trial, were not transmitted with the record). 
With the permission and consent of defendants Malstrom, 
appellant entered into a Lease Agreement with Perkins' Cake 
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& Steak Restaurant on December 20, 1976 (Page 1791). on 
March 28. 1977, appellant then formally exercised its option 
on the second large parcel of property, of which plaintiff's 
leasehold was a part (Page 1197). On April 4. 1977, appel-
lant entered into a Construction Agreement with Jack L. Kerbs, 
Inc., for the construction by Kerbs of the Perkins' restaurant 
on a parcel of property between the Grand Central common park-
ing lot on the east and the common parking area located to 
the south of plaintiff's theater (Pages 1792 and 1795). 
B. Plaintiff's Lease. 
The Lease between defendants Malstrom and plaintiff, 
dated March 25, 1972, expressly provided for the lease to 
plaintiff of a parcel of real property measuring 70' x 120' 
"together with parking space and access to be set aside and 
allotted as hereinafter more particularly described." (Page 
8). Paragraph 2 of said Lease provided for the construction 
by plaintiff of a building on the leased premises for use 
as a motion picture theater. Paragraph 3 then provided: 
There is hereby allotted to the Lessee for parking, 
a strip of land 70 feet in width and 234 feet in 
depth. running from the South side of the above 
described parcel to the North side of 9400 South 
Street, and an additional tract 40 feet in width 
and 162 feet in depth. from the parcel next ad-
joining the West side of this tract. • . • The 
Lessee shall install and maintain at~de 
established by the Lessor and in accordance with 
the standard of the Albertson's parking lot, all 
~ving, lighting, curbs and gutter~s, sidewalks 
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This paragraph was inserted in the Lease because no curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks or traffic control improvements had then 
been constructed along 9400 South and the common parking 
area, and it was contemplated that the city would soon 
require such items as the shopping center was developed 
(Pages 1762-1766. 2177-2179). 
Under Paragraph 6, plaintiff agreed to the removal and 
replacement of all signs previously erected by it with a 
sign in conformity with the rules and regulations of a mer-
chant's association which was to be developed in the shop-
ping center, but which had not been formed at the time of 
the trial of this case. Again, it was understood that such 
changes would be made in light of the contemplated shopping 
center development (Pages 1762-1769. 2177-2179). Plaintiff 
then agreed in Paragraph 7 as follows: 
All parking facilities, lj_ghti~ili t:ie3 and 
9_pen_spaces upon the lea~~emises are to_be 
used in common with other occupants of property 
of the Lessor for the maintenance and de~elopment: 
of a shopping center and no barriers shall be con-
structed or permitted which will bar access to 
such parking facilities and access roads by ten-
ants of other premises or their customers or guests. 
The Lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining 
property similar covenants and agreements so that 
the Lessee shall have similar unobstructed access 
to parking, lighting and other common facilities 
of adjoining tenants. (Emphasis added). 
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Paragraph 8 of the Lease further provided: 
It is the_ int_e_ntion _9_f__the~rties that this 
shall be ~ lea~~o~ l~nd onlY_ for the purpose of 
construction of bu1ld1ngs or i~ovements in con-
nection with an integrated sh~pp1n9-cen~~ 
both Q_f the_e_arties hereto will encourage the -
~~velQ_Ement of adjoining properties for such-
purpose. . (Emphasis added). -
On July 1, 1977, plaintiff and defendants Malstrom entered 
into an Addendum to Lease and Agreement relating to the inter-
pretation of certain provisions of the March 25, 1972 Lease 
and to certain claimed defaults under the terms of said Lease 
{Page 18). A lawsuit had previously been filed by the Malstroms 
against plaintiff, in which the Malstroms alleged that plain-
tiff had defaulted in the performance of certain terms and 
conditions of its Lease. That suit was resolved and an Ad-
dendum to the original Lease of March 25. 1972, was agreed 
upon as a part of the settlement (Page 1993). Accordingly, 
Paragraph 4 of that Addendum provided: 
The Lessor does hereby acknowledge and confirm 
that as of the date hereof [July 1, 1977] Lessee 
is in full and current compliance in all respects 
as Tenant with all terms, provisions and covenants 
of said Lease and Agreement dated March 25, 1972, 
as amended hereby, and Lessee does hereby acknowl-
edge and confirm that as of the date hereof Lessor 
is in full and current compliance in all respects 
as Landlord with all terms, provisions and cove-
nants of said Lease and Agreement dated March 27, 
1972, which Lease and Agreement is as to both 
Lessee and Lessor in good standing and subject to 
no defaults. 
-5-
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The Addendum did not change any of the original Lease provi-
sions quoted above. 
As of the date of the Addendum between plaintiff and 
defendants Malstrom (July 1, 1977), the contractor for the 
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant had poured the footings 
and foundations in connection with the construction of the 
restaurant and had completed the framing of the restaurant 
building. The precise location of ~he building in relation 
to plaintiff's theater and the common parking area to the 
south of the theater was therefore plainly apparent (Pages 
2295 and 2298). Prior to the execution of the Addendum, 
however, plaintiff had not complained about nor objected to 
the construction of the restaurant, but rather acknowledged 
that the Landlord of the shopping center was in full compli-
ance with all terms of plaintiff's Lease at that time (Pages 
3 and 894). 
C. Construction Of Perkins' Cake & Steak Restau-
rant And Relocation Of Chantel Theater Sign. 
During the negotiation of a permit with Sandy City for 
the construction of the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. 
representatives of Price Rentals, in consultation with Sandy 
City officials, submitted several drafts of site plans to 
the Sandy City Planning Department as part of the conditional 
use permit (C.U.P.) process (Pages 2138-2141, 2148, 2149, 
1808, 1809, 1855). Sandy City finally approved a site plan, 
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but initiated certain changes in the plans submitted (Page 
1856). Sandy City then issued a building permit conditioned 
upon compliance by Price Rentals of certain requirements 
imposed by the City (Pages 1809-1812, 1852-1861, 2141-2144, 
2148-2151). These requirements included: (a) construction 
of a driveway immediately to the west of Perkins' Cake & 
steak Restaurant, extending into common parking areas of 
the center- approximately half of which was located on the 
common parking area immediately south of plaintiff's theater, 
and the other half of which was located on the property leased 
by Perkins' Cake & Steak~ (b) construction of a landscaped 
area adjoining 9400 South and located immediately to the 
west of the driveway entrance as a traffic control device: 
(c) removal of plaintiff's theater sign, as required by the 
City since the sign was located in the middle of the drive-
way and therefore constituted a "traffic hazard": and (d) 
construction of certain curb, guttering and sidewalks in 
accordance with the master plan for Sandy City, and as was 
contemplated in the lease. 
Because the issuance of an occupancy certificate for the 
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant by Sandy City was expressly 
conditioned upon removal of plaintiff's theater sign, repre-
sentatives of Price Rentals attempted in June, 1977, to obtain 
plaintiff's approval for the relocation of plaintiff's theater 
sign or the construction of a replacement sign (Pages 2298-
2301, 2314). Appellant agreed to bear the cost of the con-
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struction of such a sign, even though plaintiff had agreed 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of its Lease with the Malstroms "not 
to construct or permit any barriers ... which will bar 
access to such (common) parking facilities and access roads 
by tenants of other premises or their customers or guests" 
(Pages 2284-2291. 2299-2300). As previously noted, Para-
graph 8 of the Lease also committed both parties to "en-
courage the development of adjoining properties" for the 
purpose of constructing "buildings and improvements" in 
connection with an "integrated shopping center". During 
the course of said conversations, Marv Dobkins of Price 
Rentals brought to the plaintiff's attention that the sign 
constituted a traffic hazard and had to be relocated in 
order to open the restaurant (Pages 2298-2305). Following 
various unsuccessful attempts to obtain plaintiff's cooper-
ation in the relocation of the sign. Price Rentals informed 
plaintiff in October and November, 1977, that the restaurant 
would open on November 7, 1977, and that it would be neces-
sary to remove and relocate the Chantel Theater sign in 
accordance with Sandy City's requirements (Pages 2284-2291, 
2299-2300). Price Rentals also advised plaintiff that it 
would relocate the sign at its own cost (Pages 2284-2291, 
2299-2300). 
The parties agreed that the sign would be relocated at 
a location to be determined, although certain evidence per-
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taining to that agreement was not admitted by the Court 
(Page 2292). This matter is assigned as error and will be 
discussed hereafter. Accordingly, the sign was removed on 
November 4, 1977, in accordance with the requirements of 
sandy City (Page 2136). Price Rentals immediately arranged 
for a portable sign containing the name of the theater, 
which was expected to be used for a brief period while the 
sign was relocated in accordance with instructions to be 
provided by plaintiff {Page 1985). As of the time of trial, 
Price Rentals had paid the entire cost of rental and light-
ing of the portable sign, which was displayed at the west 
end of the landscaped island immediately adjacent to 9400 
South (Page 1985). Since the time of the initial offer of 
sign replacement, Price Rentals made several specific pro-
posals to replace plaintiff's sign with an attractive sign 
in a location acceptable to plaintiff and Sandy City, al-
though again, the Court refused to admit any evidence of 
such proposals since they were made after the commencement 
of the present action (Pages 2329-2331). On each such oc-
casion, plaintiff either failed to respond to appellant's 
proposal or refused to accept the proposal without stating 
the reasons for such refusal or indicating what its sign 
specifications were. Again, however, the court refused to 
permit the introduction of evidence in support of those 
facts. In addition, from the date of removal of plaintiff's 
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theater sign on November 4. 1977, plaintiff deliberately 
refused to construct a replacement sign or to relocate its 
original sign, despite the fact that Sandy City would clearly 
have permitted such a relocation (Pages 2318-2320). 
D. Nature Of Plaintiff's Claims. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Complaint (Page 3), plain-
tiff sought damages against each of the defendants, alleging 
as follows: 
1. Since the execution of the Addendum to the 
Lease on July 1. 1977, defendants entered into a "deliberate 
and malicious course of conduct" in violation of the two 
Leases, "designed to destroy the business of the plaintiff" 
with the intent to "force plaintiff to forfeit and abandon 
said Leases." 
2. Defendants entered into a Lease with Perkins' 
Cake & Steak, which did not contain "similar covenants and 
agreements" to those of Paragraph 7 of its lease. "so that 
Lessee, (plaintiff) shall have similar unobstructed access 
to parking, lighting and other common facilities to the 
joint tenants." 
3. Defendants tore down the sign and marquee 
for plaintiff's theater. 
4. Defendants removed two lights that the plain-
tiff had installed on the parking space to the south of its 
-10-
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space to the south of its theater. (These lights were lo-
cated in the common parking area). 
5. Defendant Perkins' Cake & Steak erected a 
proposed restaurant, blocking the view of the plaintiff's 
marquee. 
6. Defendant Perkins' Cake & Steak "trespassed 
on plaintiff's leased parking space by landscaping and by 
asphalting over the same." 
7. Defendants constructed a flagpole on plain-
tiff's alleged leased parking space. 
8. Defendants have trespassed upon plaintiff's 
leased parking area. 
It is significant that at no time has Penelko claimed any 
damage prior to July 1, 1977. In fact, it specifically stated 
in its Complaint and Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine 
that it claimed no damage prior to that time (Pages 3 and 894). 
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the Court submitted 
all of the above claims to the jury in a single instruction, 
without distinguishing between plaintiff's tort claims and 
its claims for breach of lease. The jury was therefore per-
mitted to return a general verdict without specifying the 
nature of any wrongful conduct of any of the defendants. 
Further, the court's Instruction No. 21 permitted the jury to 
find any damages that would fairly and adequately compensate 
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plaintiff for any injury sustained by defendants' wrong-
ful conduct and then it stated: 
Such damages may include damages from loss of 
profits, ~f any, and punitive damages,--rf any. as 
you may find pursuant to the next instructions 
that follow. (Emphasis added) (Page 1205). 
The instruction, however, did not advise the jury that it 
could not award any damages for the time period prior to 
July 1, 1977, which was the date alleged in plaintiff's Com-
plaint as the beginning date for defendants' alleged by wrong-
ful conduct. Instruction No. 21 also stated that compensa-
tion for wrongful damage to the plaintiff's property could 
be awarded. Finally, Paragraph 7 of Instruction No. 17, as 
submitted to the jury, stated that the plaintiff was claiming 
wrongful violation of its rights because of a willful and 
malicious course of conduct by defendants designed to destroy 
plaintiff's business and force abandonment of its theater 
and lease. This claim was clearly founded in tort, but the 
jury was not instructed that in order to recover on this 
claim, plaintiff must show that defendants' conduct proxi-
~ately caused injury to plaintiff. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendants 
moved the court for a directed verdict with respect to the 
issues of liability and damages in the case (Pages 2229-
2232). Specifically, defendants contended first, that 
plaintiff, in the event defendants were found to be liable. 
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was entitled to the recovery of lost "net profits" only, 
and second. that plaintiff had scrupulously avoided putting 
on any evidence to prove its "net income." The court denied 
said motion with respect to appellant and John Price person-
ally (Page 2245). Defendants renewed their motion for a 
directed verdict upon completion of their case, and again, 
that motion was denied with respect to all of plaintiff's 
claims (Pages 2455-2457, and 2469). The court then sub-
mitted all of plaintiff's claims to the jury, and a general 
verdict in the amount of $65,000.00 was returned against 
appellant. 
Appellant contends on appeal that this Court should: 
(1) reverse the trial court's judgment on the verdict with 
instructions that the trial court enter a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict because of plaintiff's failure to pro-
duce any evidence of lost "net profits"; (2) reverse the 
trial court's judgment on the basis that the above instruc-
tions were improper and that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to permit the introduction of critical evidence relating 
to (a) plaintiff's obligation to mitigate its damages, (b) 
to the existence of an agreement between the parties for 
the relocation of the sign, and (c) to the existence of a 
laundromat lease for property contiguous to plaintiff's 
theater, which also provided for common parking facilities; 
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and (3) reverse the court's judgment because of the highly 
prejudicial conduct of the court during the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
In cases where a party seeks recovery for interference 
with its business operations or for breach of contract, loss 
of ~et profits is the proper measure of recovery. Leppla 
v. Schroeder, 532 P.2d 370, 372 (Colo. 1974); Williams v. 
Bone, 74 Idcno 185, 259 P.2d 810, 811-12 (1953); American 
Fire Protection Service v. Williams, 340 P.2d 644, 647 (Cal. 
1959): ~untert v. City of Stockton, 126 Cal.Rptr. 690, 55 
Cal.App.3d 131 (1976). The term "net profits" is defined 
as "the gains made from sales after deducting the value of 
the labor, materials, rents and all expenses. " 
Guntert v. City of Stockton, supra, at 700. 
A judgment in favor of plaintiff based on gross income 
or calculated without proper proof of all expenses to arrive 
at lost net profits must be reversed. Williams v. Bone, 
supra; _Benfiel_d v. H. K. Porter Co., 137 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 
1965). In Benfield, for example, plaintiff introduced evi-
dence of lost gross receipts only but failed to offer proof 
of proper allocable expenses to show its loss of "net profits." 
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On appeal. the Court held that plaintiff had the burden of 
showing loss of "net profits" and that proof of expenses is 
part of that burden. The judgment, which failed to take 
into account deduction of properly allocable expenses from 
lost gross receipts, was therefore reversed by the court 
and the lower court was directed to enter a verdict of no 
cause of action. Id. at 274. 
Similarly, in Williams v. Bone, supra, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reviewed an appeal in which an operator of a taxicab 
business brought an action against a lessee for removal of 
the operator's neon sign which advertised his business. To 
prove loss of business subsequent to removal of the sign, 
plaintiff submitted bank statements of gross business income 
for a period of six months prior to the time the sign was 
removed and for a period of six months after removal. No 
evidence was offered. however, with respect to "net loss" 
or "net decrease in income." The Court concluded that ex-
penses and costs of operation, from which the net profits 
or decrease in net income could be derived, must be shown 
by plaintiff. The Court then stated: 
Where a regular and established business is in-
jured, interrupted or destroyed by the wrongful 
acts of another, the measure of damages, when and 
if recoverable, is the net loss and not the dimi-
nution in gross income. 
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[T]his Court [has] held that damages could 
not be predicated on proof of gross receipts of 
the business, and that such evidence standing 
alone, is insufficient proof of damages. 259 
P.2d at 812. 
Because of plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of 
such lost net profits, the Court therefore held that the 
jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon should be 
reversed. 
As noted previously, plaintiff in this case also failed 
to produce any evidence of lost "net prof its" at the trial 
of the present case. In fact, when counsel for appellant 
attempted to cross-examine plaintiff's expert accountant 
regarding the computation of certain entries on plaintiff's 
tax returns in order to determine if he had calculated the 
net income from plaintiff's theater business, the court re-
fused to permit the examination (Pages 1931-1934). As a 
result, only evidence of gross receipts and gross income of 
plaintiff's business, without proper deduction of expenses, 
from 1973 to 1979 were before the jury (Pages 1905, 1906, 
and 1913-1916). The jury's verdict and the court's judgment 
on the verdict, therefore, should be reversed because they 
are based upon a false premise and the trial court should 
be required to enter a judgment of no cause of action against 
plaintiff. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 
LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 
A. The Court Failed To Instruct The Jury That 
The_R_roper Me~sure Of Damages Was Loss Of 
"Net Profits." 
Instruction No. 21 stated that the jury could find any 
damages that would fairly and adequately compensate plain-
tiff for any injury sustained by defendants' wrongful conduct 
and that such damages could include "damages from loss of 
profits, if any .... " The instruction, however, did not 
define "loss of profits" nor did it restrict such loss to 
"net profits". Accordingly, following preparation of the 
court's instructions to the jury, appellant excepted to the 
giving of Instruction No. 21. Similarly, appellant objected 
to the giving of Instruction No. 22 because that instruction 
failed to define "lost profits", as that term was used in 
the court's instructions, and to limit such lost profits to 
"net profits" (Pages 2531 and 2532). 
As stated above, the proper measure of damages in the 
present case, as in other cases of alleged tortious inter-
ference with business and breach of contract, is the loss 
of "net profits." In order to determine net profits, it is 
imperative that all expenses be deducted from a company's 
gross income or receipts. Guntert v. City of Stockton, 
supra, at 700; Williams v. Bone, supra, at 812; Benfield v. 
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~~· Porter C~, supra, at 274. An instruction defining 
"net profits" must be submitted to the jury by the Court. 
Leppla v. Schroeder, supra. at 372. In addition, the jury 
must be properly instructed as to the correct measure of 
damages, which is clearly limited to lost "net profits", 
not "gross profits". Guntert v. City of Stockton, supr~, 
at 700-01. 
Failure to give such an instruction in the present 
case constituted prejudicial error which had the effect of 
permitting the jury to determine damages by use of a false 
standard. In this regard, it is significant that the reduc-
tion of gross Feceipts from the operation of plaintiff's 
theater from January 1, 1977, to April 1, 1979, and the 
jury's verdict of $65,000.00 are almost identical. The 
calculations of plaintiff's expert accountant, for example, 
show the following declines in gross revenue (using 1976 as 
a base year) during the above time period (Pages 1912-1915): 
1977 $ 20,306.84 
19 78 
1979 (first 3 months) 
Total: 
39,288.73 
5,332.04 
$ 64,927.61 
The jury's verdict, on the other hand, was $65,000.00, thus 
leading to the inescapable conclusion that the jury relied 
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on plaintiff's accounting summary of 9ross rec~ipts in making 
its award. The court's instruction concerning damages jus-
tified that erroneous result. As stated by this Court in 
Gull Laboratories. Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756, 
759 (Utah 1978): 
Generally, a jury verdict will only be upset where 
the error committed was so substantial and prejudi-
cial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been different in the absence of 
such error. In the instant case, the damages found 
by the jury are exactly as claimed in the inadmis-
sible summary; hence, we are compelled to conclude 
that the jury relied on the summary in making its 
award. For these reasons the judgment is reversed 
and the case is remanded for a new trial. 
B. The Court Did Not Instruct The Jury As To 
The Relevant Time Period For Which Damages 
Could Be Computed. 
Instruction No. 21 submitted by the Court not only 
failed to instruct the jury that no damages could be awarded 
for the time period prior to July 1, 1977, but permitted 
the jury .to speculate concerning future damages beyond the 
date of trial. In plaintiff's Complaint and its Response 
to Defendants' Motion in Limine, the plaintiff stated that 
it did not claim any damages for any act that occurred prior 
to July 1, 1977 (Page 894). Accordingly, defendants re-
quested that the Court instruct the jury that it must limit 
its consideration of the plaintiff's claims and damages to 
the period following July 1, 1977 (Page 1010). The instruc-
tion was rejected by the Court. 
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In Guntert v. City of Stockton, supra at 699, the Court 
stated that a computation of damages which included a time 
period preceding any actual breach of contract or wrongful 
conduct would not be permitted. In addition, the Court 
stated that in cases where only a partial breach occurs, 
the injured party may recover damages for non-performance 
only to the time of trial and may not recover future dam-
ages. Id. at 702. Such a result is particularly mandated 
where the plaintiff continues in business and seeks injunc-
tive relief, as in the present case. Id. 
The evidence before the court in the present case clearly 
showed that the plaintiff was not claiming any damages prior 
to July 1, 1977. However, the evidence also showed that, 
during the first six months of 1977 (prior to any allegedly 
unlawful conduct by defendant), plaintiff's gross income 
was $25,869, compared to gross income of $34,497 during the 
same six-month period in 1976. Consequently, plaintiff had 
experienced an actual decline of gross income from its theater 
operations during the above time period of $8,628, represent-
ing a 25% decrease, prior to the time the plaintiff claimed 
that defendant engaged in any unlawful conduct (Pages 1916-
1917). Instruction No. 21 provided no time limitation for 
the computation of damages and permitted the jury to specu-
late that the loss of gross receipts, as well as any other 
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losses for the entire year of 1977 and future losses, could 
be awarded. It should also be stressed that the above in-
struction permitted the jury to review plaintiff's claims 
in total in assessing damage, without any guidance from the 
court with respect to the fact that the sign was not removed 
until November 4, 1977, and the Perkins' restaurant did not 
even open for business until November 7, 1977. Even so, 
Instruction No. 21 permitted the jury to assess damages 
without regard for these dates. 
C. The Court's Instructions Permitted The Jury 
To Award Damages For Diminution Of The Parking 
Area To The South Of Plaintiff's Theater. 
Instruction No. 21 stated that compensation for wrong-
ful damage to the plaintiff's property could be awarded. 
Again, this instruction is too broad and erroneously per-
mitted the jury to conclude that it was authorized to find 
damages to plaintiff's leasehold interest resulting from 
claimed improper construction by defendant in the common 
parking area to the south of the theater. It should be em-
phasized that there was absolutely no evidence presented at 
trial in support of any damage resulting from the construe-
tion of the accessway and landscaped area, even assuming 
that such construction was wrongful. Plaintiff failed to 
lay any foundation whatever for the testimony of John Brown, 
its real estate appraiser (Pages 2098-2101). Nevertheless, 
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much of Mr. Brown's testimony was permitted to go to the 
jury, thus permitting it to speculate concerning "the mea-
sure of value" of plaintiff's leasehold under Instruction 
No. 21 (Pages 2040-2071). 
In Birge v. Toppers Menswear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79 
(Tex. 1971), the Court stated that a tenant cannot recover 
lost profits and the market value of his lease also, for 
such a theory would allow him a double recovery. The Court 
therefore concluded that a tenant, who sustains injury to 
his business, would be made whole by allowing recovery of 
lost net profits without regard to the rental value of the 
premises. Accordingly, the lower court erred in the present 
case in failing to instruct the jury that no recovery could 
be had for the market value of the plaintiff's Lease. 
D. The Court Failed To Instruct The Jury With 
Respect To Proximate Cause On Plaintiff's 
Claim For Tortious Conduct. 
Paragraph 7 of Instruction No. 17 stated that the 
plaintiff was claiming wrongful violation of its rights be-
cause of a willful and malicious course of conduct by defen-
dants designed to destroy plaintiff's business and force 
abandonment of its theater and lease. The Court lumped all 
of plaintiff's claims together in Instruction No. 17 and per-
mitted the jury to render a verdict without differentiation 
as to its findings based upon tortious injury to plaintiff's 
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business or to plaintiff's claims of breach of lease. Finally, 
and most importantly, the jury was not instructed that, in 
order to recover on its claim for tortious interference with 
plaintiff's business, plaintiff must show that defendants' 
conduct proximately caused the injury. Clearly such an in-
struction was required. See Charvos v. Bonneville Irrigation 
District, 235 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1951). 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO PERMIT THE 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT WAS RELEVANT AND 
MATERIAL TO VITAL DEFENSES RAISED BY DEFENDANT. 
A. The Court Refused To Permit Defendants~re­
sentatives To Testify That They Had Offered 
To Erect A Si~n For Plaintiff In The Common 
Parking Area To The South Of Plaintiff's Leased 
Premises. 
The unrefutable evidence presented at the trial of the 
present case showed that, following the removal of plain-
tiff's theater sign from the middle of the driveway in the 
common parking area to the south of plaintiff's theater, 
the sign sat to the side of the theater for over one and 
one half years. Mr. Bernard Reynolds, the Sandy City Plan-
ner, testified unequivocally that the City would have per-
mitted relocation of plaintiff's sign in any part of the 
common parking area to the south of the theater, provided 
that the location would not create a safety problem (Pages 
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2318-2320: see also pages 1874-1875). The evidence was 
also clear that a double sign on the same pylon, one for 
plaintiff's theater and the other for the laundromat lo-
cated immediately adjacent to plaintiff's theater, could 
have also been placed in the parking lot (Page 1884). 
Doyle Nelson, a director and officer of plaintiff corpora-
tion, and Mr. Reynolds further testified that plaintiff 
never filed an application with Sandy City for relocation 
of its sign (Pages 2037 and 2320). 
However, when appellant attempted to introduce evi-
dence that it had offered, on various occasions following 
commencement of the present action, to construct a replace-
ment sign or a double sign in the common parking area, the 
Court refused to permit any such evidence pertaining to ap-
pellant's offers (Pages 2292 and 2399-2431). Similarly, 
the court refused to permit the owner of the adjacent 
cleaning business testify that he had no objection to the 
erection of a double sign consisting of one sign for the 
cleaners and one for the theater (Page 2356). When appel-
lant first attempted to introduce its evidence of sign 
proposals, the Court stated: "Don't want any conversation 
or testimony about what took place after this lawsuit was 
started." (Page 2292). Defendant then made a proffer of 
proof with respect to the evidence that it intended to submit, 
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showing that on September 22, 1978, it submitted to plain-
tiff an additional proposal for a double sign for which pre-
liminary approval from Sandy City had been obtained. 
Included with a letter to plaintiff of the same date were 
copies of the drawing from a sign company for plaintiff's 
review. The letter also stated that "consistent with our 
previous proposals in the matter, we will bear the cost of 
construction and installation of such a sign upon receipt 
of your approval without prejudice to any of the claims of 
Penelko, Inc., in the pending litigation." (Page 2329). 
Like the earlier proposals made by defendant to plaintiff, 
the proposal did not relate to settlement. It was made 
simply to enable plaintiff to mitigate its damages without 
any prejudice to its claims. 
Appellant also contended at the trial that the sign 
proposals related to defendant's good faith and were there-
fore material to the issue of punitive damages. Counsel 
for appellant took the further position that such evidence 
was material to the issue of mitigation of damages, but 
the Court stated that the plaintiff had 'r.he responsibility 
of doing what it can to mitigate damages, independent of an 
offer from the defendants to help them do that" (Page 2331). 
The Court stated that the two documents relating to the sign 
proposals would not be admitted for any purpose. 
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Under Utah law, an injured party must make a reasonable 
effort to avoid loss and cannot sit idly by and uselessly 
abide its time after another's breach of contract or duty, 
assuming that such breach exists. University Club v. Invesco 
Holding Corporation, 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972); Casey v. Nelson 
Brothers Construction Company, 465 P.2d 173 (Utah 1970); 
Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 801 (Utah 1969). This Court's 
position in this regard is consistent with that of other 
jurisdictions. In Hill v. Liner. 336 A.2d 533 (D.C. 1975), 
the Court stated: 
Damages which may be avoided . . . are not 
the direct or natural consequences of the defen-
dant's wrong, since it is plaintiff's option to 
suffer them. In such a situation, the plaintiff 
is damaged, not by the defendant's act, but by 
his own negligence or indifference to the conse-
quences. . . . If a party fails to take reason-
able precautions or make a reasonable effort to 
avoid injury to his property or business, he can-
not recover damages for such injuries as he could 
have avoided. 
Such action is especially required where the effort to miti-
gate is triffling but the damage resulting from a failure 
to make such effort would be large. 49 Am.Jur.2d 849. 
Further. the law is clear that an offer of the defen-
dant to enable plaintiff to mitigate his damages is admis-
sible in a contract action where plaintiff fails to avail 
himself of such offer. In Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 
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(Ark. 1970), for example, a homeowner brought an action 
against the defendant contractor for damage caused by de-
fective construction, which led to the flooding of plain-
tiff's house. Soon after the defect became apparent, 
defendant proposed the installation of an automatic sump 
pump below the level of the ducts to prevent the flood 
damage. Plaintiff, however, refused to allow the automatic 
pump to be installed, insisting that he wanted to know 
where the water was coming from and would accept nothing 
less. A period of two years then elapsed before the action 
was finally brought. In its decision, the Court stated: 
In the main, Wawak is correct in his argument 
that the Stewarts should have mitigated their dam-
ages by permitting the installation of the automatic 
pump. On the record made below it is an undisputed 
fact that such a pump would have avoided practically 
all the itemized damages that were allowed by the 
trial court. Id. at 927. 
Although the pump would not have corrected the basic defect, 
the Court held that the amount of plaintiff's judgment should 
have been reduced to the amount necessary to correct the de-
feet and that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery for its 
damage because of its refusal to accept defendant's proposal. 
The undisputed evidence at trial in the present case 
showed that plaintiff deliberately refused to take any action 
to relocate its sign. The refusal of the court, however, 
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to permit defendant to introduce proper evidence relating 
to defendant's repeated proposals to relocate the sign or 
to construct a replacement sign at its expense constitutes 
a misapplication of the law by the lower court. Plaintiff's 
duty to avoid the direct and natural consequences of any 
wrong committed by defendant extends not only to what it 
could do to mitigate its damages independent of an offer 
from defendant to assist in such efforts, but also to rea-
sonable proposals from defendant to assist plaintiff in 
avoiding any loss that might arise from the removal of the 
sign. Identical policy considerations in favor of mitiga-
tion of damages are applicable in both instances as clearly 
illustrated in Wawak and certainly would have mandated in-
troduction of defendant's proposals in the present case, 
especially since those proposals were made expressly without 
prejudice to any of plaintiff's claims. Otherwise, a plain-
tiff would be encouraged to file a suit and thereby preclude 
the defendant from taking reasonable action to assist plain-
tiff in mitigating damages, a result offensive to the law 
and contrary to proper public policy. 
B. The Court Erred In Refusing To Admit Into 
Evidence The Laundromat Lease To Show That 
Additional Common Parking Facilities Existed 
Immediatel_y Adjacent To The Common Park~ 
Lot Described In Plaintiff's Lease. 
One of the major issues during the trial of the present 
case related to plaintiff's claim that defendants had tres-
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passed upon "plaintiff's leased parking area." During the 
presentation of plaintiff's case, plaintiff's officers tes-
tified that patrons of the Perkins Cake & Steak Restaurant 
used many of the parking stalls in the parking area to the 
south of plaintiff's theater. These officers also testi-
fied that the theater patrons had very few, if any, parking 
spaces within "plaintiff's leased parking area" within 
which to park. When, however, defendant attempted to intro-
duce into evidence the laundromat lease, showing that that 
lease also provided for common parking facilities immediately 
adjacent to the parking area described in plaintiff's lease, 
the court refused to permit its introduction (Pages 1776-78). 
In sustaining plaintiff's objection to keep the lease from 
being admitted into evidence, counsel for defendant stated 
that the lease pertained to the common parking areas. In 
response, the court stated: "That doesn't matter" and re-
fused to consider the lease further (Pages 1776-1777). 
Inasmuch as plaintiff had claimed that defendants were 
trespassing on its "leased parking area," leases for prop-
erties adjacent to plaintiff's were relevant to show that 
parking facilities, like the parking area to the south of 
plaintiff's theater, were to be used in common by all ten-
ants of the center and that additional common parking spaces 
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existed immediately adjacent to this theater. Throughout 
the trial plaintiff referred to the area south of the theater 
as its "leased parking area" when in fact it was a common 
parking area. The lower court's refusal to admit the laun-
dromat lease into evidence for purposes of showing the re-
ciprocal and common nature of parking adjacent to plaintiff's 
theater denied appellant the right to prove to the jury the 
extent and nature of the common parking areas within the 
center, which were available for use by plaintiff's patrons. 
C. The Court Erred In Excluding An Admission 
Of Counsel That Plaintiff Had Agreed_To 
A Relocation Of Its Theater Sign. 
During the course of legal proceedings, all parties 
are bound by the formal admissions of their counsel in the 
action, whether such admissions be in the pleadings or in 
open court. Dick v. Drainage District No. 2, 358 P.2d 744 
(Kan. 1961); Anderson v. Thomas, 336 P.2d 821 (Kan. 1959). 
In plaintiff's petition for intermediate appeal, filed ap-
proximately one month following the removal of plaintiff's 
theater sign, counsel for plaintiff stated that he, while 
acting as counsel for plaintiff in this matter, had an 
agreement with counsel for defendant "that Carley Coplin, 
plaintiff's representative, and Marv Dobkins, defendant's 
representative, would meet and select an alternative place 
for the erection of plaintiff's marquee." During the cross-
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examination of Mrs. Coplin, counsel for defendant stated 
that he would read a statement to Mrs. Coplin and ask if 
the statement accurately reflected her understanding. The 
court, however, stated: "I am not going to allow you to 
question her concerning anything that is set forth in that 
document" (Page 1991). Counsel for defendant then asked 
Mrs. Coplin if it was her understanding that an agreement 
existed for the removal and relocation of the sign in an 
area to be selected by plaintiff. Mrs. Coplin was permit-
ted to answer in the negative with no opportunity for coun-
sel for defendant to use plaintiff's prior admission through 
counsel as set forth in the above petition for intermediate 
appeal. The jury, therefore, heard substantial evidence 
from Mrs. Coplin that defendant removed the theater sign 
over her objections, when, in fact, the parties had an un-
derstanding that the sign would be relocated in an area of 
plaintiff's choice, and appellant was denied the right to 
introduce evidence in support of it. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
THE JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S 
PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS DURING THE TRIAL. 
As a general rule, any misconduct on the part of the 
trial judge from which it may be rightfully determined that 
the jury was influenced in rendering its verdict constitutes 
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prejudicial error, requiring a reversal of the judgment. 
Etzel v. Rosenbloo~, 189 P.2d 848, 850 (Cal. 1948). The 
judge presiding at the trial should conduct it in a fair 
and impartial manner, refraining from making comments dur-
ing the course of the trial which may lead to a prejudicial 
result to one of the parties. Id. Under Utah law, a re-
versal of the trial court's judgment is warranted when the 
conduct of the judge is so prejudicial that there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that the jury verdict would have been 
different in the absence of such conduct. See Gull Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 
1978): Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966). 
Such a result is particularly appropriate where, as provided 
by Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the sub-
stantial rights of the parties are prejudiced by the court's 
conduct during the course of the trial. 
It is also clear that a party is entitled to a reversal 
of the judgment based upon a court's comment on the evidence 
or other improper statements in the presence of the jury. 
See Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Such statements 
will constitute reversible error if a party is deprived of 
a fair and impartial trial. Glowacki v. A. J. Bayless Mar-
kets, 263 P.2d 799, 801 (Ariz. 1953). Further, even in cases 
where the comments of a judge, taken separately, may not 
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justify a reversal of the judgment, if the cumulative effect 
of various comments or remarks by the trial judge prejudice 
the appellant's case, then the judgment will be reversed 
and a new trial ordered. Delzell v. Day, 223 P.2d 625, 626 
(Cal. 1950). Again, the test to determine such prejudice, 
is whether in the absence of such comments and judicial mis-
conduct, there is a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been different. See Id. 
In the present case, plaintiff sought repeatedly to 
qualify its expert real estate appraiser to testify concern-
ing diminution in the value of its leasehold as a result of 
the construction of a landscaped island and access way in a 
portion of the common parking area to the south of plaintiff's 
theater (Pages 2052-2093). During the course of such exami-
nation, the court reiterated at least four times that the 
evidence was clear that defendants had constructed improve-
ments in the parking area leased by plaintiff and that what 
the court was concerned with was the damage caused by such 
construction on plaintiff's leasehold (Pages 2060-2061). 
It was evident that the court had taken a position that the 
construction was wrongful and that the only issue was whether 
plaintiff had sustained any damage: 
I don't think we need to go into what the building 
itself would rent for. These people built the 
building; they own it. They lease the land on 
which it is built. They lease the parking area 
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in front of it. The defendants came along and 
made some changes in the_Earking area, and~t 
we are concerned with here is what damages, if 
any, were caused by those changes. And so, the 
theater itself remains the same; there is no dif-
ference there. It's the damage, if any, to the 
leasehold because of the changes in the parking 
area, we are concerned with here, and I think he 
has got to limit his testimony and opinion with 
respect to change in value of the leasehold in 
that light. (Emphasis added). 
Then. during the examination of Mr. John Price, presidenl 
of appellant corporation, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Miner: 
Mr. Lybbert: 
The Court: 
The Witness: 
The Court: 
Mr. Price, would you be willing to have 
the landscape and the roadway placed on 
the east side of the Perkins Cake & 
Steak Restaurant? 
Well, your Honor please, it is not placed 
there. There is no prayer that it be 
placed there. 
Well, I will overrule the objection 
and let him answer the question. 
Well, may I please state this again, 
your Honor, I am not trying to avoid 
the question but if the lease conditions. 
which is a legal document, indicates 
the roadway is to be on the west, in 
my frame of thinking, I would have to 
say that this is the place I would put 
the roadway. 
This lawsuit arises because the roadway 
and landscaping is put upon the property 
leased to the theater property. It is 
on their lease and this lawsuit is because 
of the fact that that roadway and that 
landscaping was constructed on the park-
ing area leased to the Penelko theater. 
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The Witness: 
Mr. Lybbert: 
The Court: 
The Witness: 
Which, your Honor, I thought we had 
the common right of use also, and I 
guess that is why the layout was laid 
out in this way, Sir. 
Your Honor, may I note an objection 
for the record. I do not believe this 
statement of the Court is wholly accurate 
in view of the lease document. 
Well, that is what the lawsuit is about 
and had Mr. Price been here throughout 
the trial last week, he might have un-
derstood more fully what Mr. Henderson's 
question was. I simply tried to make 
it more clear to him. The objection 
the plaintiff has here, is you built 
the roadway and the landscaped island 
there on their leased property, and he 
asked you whether or not you would have 
any objection to moving it to the east 
side of the restaurant building. 
Yes. I would, because as I was concerned 
and informed under the conditions of 
our lease that this property was in 
common (Pages 2206 and 2207). 
In each of the above instances, the Court's comments 
regarding the evidence were made in the presence of the 
jury. Not only were the Court's comments on the evidence 
incorrect, but they were highly prejudicial to defendant's 
case. First, the lease provisions quoted above clearly show 
that the property to the south of plaintiff's theater was 
for the common parking of all tenants within the shopping 
center. The preamble to the lease stated that certain park-
ing space and access would be set aside and allotted "as 
hereinafter more particularly described." Paragraph 7 of 
Plaintiff's lease then clearly provided: 
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All parking facilities, lighting facilities 
and open spaces upon the leased premises are to be 
used in common with other occupants of property 
of the lessor for the maintenance and development 
of a shopping center .••• 
In addition, paragraph 3 stated that the lessee would install 
and maintain "all paving, lighting, curbs and gutterings, 
sidewalks and other walkways necessary for the possession 
and use of the said premises or required by any governmental 
authority for the use of and access to the same." In this 
regard, the undisputed evidence at trial clearly established 
that when the plaintiff executed its lease, there were no 
sidewalks, curbs or gutters between the common parking lot 
to the south of its theater and 9400 South. Accordingly, 
cars could enter into the parking facility without any con-
trol lanes or direction markers. The undisputed evidence 
also showed that Sandy City had required construction of an 
access way on a portion of the common parking and access 
area to the south of plaintiff's theater, as well as the 
landscaped area, which was required as a traffic control 
island for purposes of ingress and egress to and from 9400 
South. 
Based upon the above evidence, the judge's comments 
were clearly erroneous. The misstatement "that the roadway 
and that landscaping was constructed on the parking area 
leased to the Penelko theater" was made without regard to 
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the clear provisions of the lease authorizing the construc-
tion. The Court's repeated statements tended to reaffirm 
in the minds of the jurors that the parking area belonged 
to plaintiff under its lease and that the only question was 
whether the construction of the "driveway and landscaping" 
caused any damage to plaintiff. It is evident that the 
judge's continued comments and conclusions on this evidence 
and the context in which they were made, were of such a 
character as to cause the jury to believe that the court 
had determined that defendant had no right to place the land-
scaping and access way in the common parking lot, that Mr. 
Price was not telling the truth, and that the plaintiff was 
entitled to any damages which the jury might find. Further, 
the repetition by the Court of such statements prejudiced 
the rights of defendant and precluded defendant from having 
a fair opportunity to have the jury decide the evidence with-
out the misstatements of facts and conclusions by the Court 
on these crucial issues. 
The context and reasons for the above improper comments 
on the evidence by the Court are illustrated by the follow-
ing statements of the Court following plaintiff's attempted 
proffer of proof with respect to the testimony of Mr. Brown: 
I will say unequivocally that Sandy City and John 
Price, or Price Rentals, had no right whatsoever 
to allocate to the restaurant as its parking stalls 
any of the parking space on the plaintiff's ~eased 
land. Notwithstanding the fact that Sandy City 
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has some statutory authority to control construc-
tion and zoning and improvements and signs and 
things like that. I do not recognize that Sandy 
City or John Price or Price Rentals had any au-
thority to give the restaurant any more interest 
in the plaintiff's leased land than the regular 
public had to use in that property. . . . As I 
see it, what Price did in connection with the 
construction of the restaurant, by that I mean 
Price as grantor and Price Rentals as the lessor 
to the restaurant or as the builder of the res-
taurant, building on property that it had leased 
from the Malstroms, I don't see that Price or Price 
Rentals had any authority to authorize any con-
struction upon the plaintiff's facilities, nor do 
I see that Sandy City had any authority to autho-
rize Price Rentals or the restaurant people to 
encroach upon the plaintiff's facilities, other 
than the fact that I think its customers, along 
with the customers of the other lessees there 
under the lease to the plaintiff, had a right to 
use the parking spaces in the leased parking area. 
And, as I view it, your primary problem here is 
the question of damages (Pages 2098-2099). 
Although the above statement by the court was made outside 
the presence of the jury, it is evident that the court had 
taken a position early in the case, despite the clear lan-
guage of the lease which authorized the construction of curb, 
sidewalk and driveway improvements as required by Sandy City, 
that defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct and that the 
only issue was the issue of damages. The court's position 
was reaffirmed in the presence of the jury on several occa-
sions and improperly created an impression in the mind of 
the jury that appellant had no right to do what it did, and 
that the only issue was whether any damage had been sus-
tained by the plaintiff as a result of the construction of 
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the access way and landscaped area. Under the circumstances, 
appellant's right to a fair trial was substantially impaired 
by the court's improper and prejudicial conduct and comments 
on the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to present evidence of lost 
net profit at the trial, appellant is entitled to a reversal 
of the court's judgment and a judgment against plaintiff of 
no cause of action. In the alternative, appellant is enti-
tled to a reversal of the judgment on the grounds that the 
lower court committed substantial and prejudicial error which 
had the effect of depriving appellant of its right to a full 
and fair presentation and consideration of the disputed issues 
in this case. First, the court refused to admit proper evi-
dence relating to mitigation of damages, admissions of coun-
sel for plaintiff that an agreement existed for the reloca-
tion of plaintiff's sign, and an adjacent laundromat lease 
which provided for common parking facilities immediately 
adjacent to those allotted to plaintiff for its use in com-
mon with other tenants of the shopping center. Second, the 
court failed to submit an instruction to the jury that in 
the event defendants were liable, plaintiff only was enti-
tled to recover its loss of "net profits", if any, and that 
such lost net profit would be limited to the time period 
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between July 1, 1977. and the time of trial. Third, the 
court committed material error in making repeated and im-
proper comments on the evidence, which were not supported 
by the facts of the case, and which seriously prejudiced 
defendant's rights during the trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of March, 1980. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU ·~::'ty~~~~~-::::t.::~i 
By 
Rex . Madsen 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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